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Strategic Investment Timing Under Profi t Complementarities
by Giovanni Marseguerra and Flavia Cortelezzi
1. Introduction
Strategic competition among rival firms, intensive innovation and a high 
degree of system complementarity are distinctive and related features of mod-
ern information-based economic systems. More specifically, as far as system 
complementarity, two decades of rapid technological changes resulted in the 
complementary use of many products, i.e. the utility of the basic component 
parts of a system is greatly reduced if not combined with some complemen-
tary product or service. In fact, it is common to high technology industries to 
see products that are useless unless combined into a system with other prod-
ucts. Hardware is useless without software, DVD players are useless without 
content, and an operating system is useless without applications. Very often, 
moreover, there are externalities derivig from the first firm’s investment. For 
firms operating in these industries, the adoption of new technologies is a 
crucial component of the investment policies. A number of questions arise: 
Which kind of adoption pattern will be generated through competition? 
How this pattern will depend on both system complementarities and exter-
nalities generated by early adoption?
Aim of this paper is to address the above questions by analysing and quan-
tifying the effect of the irreversible adoption of a new technology whose returns 
are uncertain, when firms have an advantage to investing when others also in-
vest and there are externalities from adoption. We derive the optimal adoption 
timing by applying the real option approach of modern investment theory.
The analysis of strategic investment decisions within the real option ap-
proach in a game theoretical setting has been the subject of intense re-
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search interest. Recent surveys of real options and strategic competition 
may be found in Boyer et al. (2004) and Marseguerra - Cortelezzi (2006). 
More specifically, our work is closely related to Fudenberg - Tirole (1985), 
Smets (1991), Huisman - Kort (1999, 2004), Kong - Kwok (2007) and Ma-
son - Weeds (2010). Fudenberg - Tirole (1985) present the first strategic in-
vestment model that analyses the effect of pre-emption in games of timing 
in the adoption of a new technology by two competing firms. Though their 
model assumes zero market uncertainty, their technique of relating the threat 
of pre-emption to rent equalization forms the cornerstone of the subsequent 
analysis of strategic investment model. Rent equalization is the fundamental 
principle according to which the benefits of the leader and of the follower 
are equal, i.e. the leader invests as soon as demand reaches the pre-emption 
point. In a subsequent work, Smets (1991) introduces uncertainty and de-
velops a continuous time stochastic duopoly timing game to analyse strate-
gic interactions among firms’ investment decisions. Huisman - Kort (1999) 
extend Smets (1991) allowing for both firms operating in the same output 
market before investment. Their main result is that in the pre-emption equi-
librium situations occur where it is optimal for one firm to invest but at the 
same time investment is not beneficial if both firms decide to do so. How-
ever, being the firms identical, the possibility arises for both firms simultane-
ously investing and receiving a low pay-off. They find that such a coordina-
tion failure can occur with positive probability when the leader’s payoff is 
strictly greater than the follower’s pay-off. Huisman - Kort (2004) focus on 
the strategic effect of the adoption of a new technology. A firm that invests 
today bears the risk of a much better technology becoming available at an 
unknown future time. This implies an incentive to delay the investment, thus 
increasing the option value of waiting to invest in the current technology. On 
the other hand, the fear of being pre-empted by a competitor may induce the 
firm to invest quickly disregarding future technological progress. These con-
siderations could turn a pre-emption game into a war of attrition, when the 
first mover invests in the current technology while the second mover waits 
for the new technology to arrive and invests then in it. Kong - Kwok (2007) 
examine strategic investment games between two firms that compete for op-
timal entry in a project with uncertain revenue flows. They introduce asym-
metry on both the sunk cost of investment and revenue flows and provide a 
complete characterization of pre-emptive, dominant and simultaneous equi-
libria. In particular, they show that under negative externalities a firm may 
reduce the loss of real options value by selecting appropriate pre-emptive 
entry, while under positive externalities firms do not compete to lead. Ma-
son - Weeds (2010) develop an irreversibile investment two-player dynamic 
model with strategic interactions and externalities between investing agents. 
As is well known (see Marseguerra - Cortelezzi - Dominioni, 2006), under 
the possibility of pre-emption a firm’s entry point is influenced by two oppo-
site forces: the desire to wait for optimal entry and the urge to preempt. Ma-
son - Weeds show that the leader’s investment trigger is bounded above as 
475
uncertainty increases and under certain parameter values greater uncertainty 
may even force the leader to invest earlier.
Our model departs from the reviewed literature in several directions. 
First, we consider two firms already active on the output market, while most 
of the literature is concentrated on the new market model. Second, we con-
sider a two-person game of irreversible investments under uncertainty. Like 
Huissman - Kort (1999) we consider technological uncertainty but we add 
system complementarities. Finally, unlike Mason - Weeds (2010), we concen-
trate our analysis on the direct effect of complementary products, while they 
study the indirect network effect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formalises the 
assumptions of the model. Section 3 analyses the interaction between two in-
vesting firms when the order of actions is exogenously given. In Section 4 
the pre-emption equilibrium is examined whilst Section 5 derives the coop-
erative adoption case as a benchmark for the subsequent efficiency analysis 
developed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
Let us consider two symmetric and risk neutral firms engaged in dynamic 
competition over an infinite horizon. Both firms make use of an established 
technology and have access to a new technology which will improve the equi-
librium profits of the adopting firm. They must decide whether and when to 
switch from the existing technology to the new one, i.e. firms hold the op-
tion to invest in the new technology. Finally, we consider firms already active 
on the market.
One of the main features of our model is represented by the assumption 
relative to complementarities in the product market. The notion of profit 
complementarity is a cumulative measure of several effects. Demand-side 
complementary products and economies of scope will generate profit com-
plementarity, whereas demand-side substitution and diseconomies of scope 
will generate negative profit complementarity. Even if the precise definition 
of profit complementarity may vary by context, for technology adoption situ-
ations like those examined in the present paper it suffices to define the in-
vestment strategies made by the two firms as profit positive (negative) com-
plements if the adoption of the technology by one firm increases (decreases) 
the profitability of the other.
Let r(x, y), x, y ∈ {1, 2}, be the equilibrium payoff for a given firm where 
the first argument denotes the technology adopted, either the existing tech-
nology (1) or the new available technology (2) for that firm, and the second 
argument pertains to its competitor. To adopt the innovation, firms incur a 
sunk cost I, independent of the adoption timing. We assume I to be equal 
for both firms. These payoffs are quite general and apply both to product 
and process innovation. In the last case, they can be interpreted as the out-
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come of an irreversible investment in R&D to lower the production costs. As 
far as the per period equilibrium profits, the following relations hold:
(1) r(1, 1) < π (2, 1)
(2) r(1, 2) < π (2, 2)
(3) r(2, 1) < π (2, 2)
Assumption 1 formalises the notion that a successful implementation 
of the new technology yields higher profits. In other words, each firm can 
make more profits when it produces with the more efficient technology. 
Assumptions 2 and 3 state that once one of the two firms adopted the 
efficient technology, joint adoption is preferable for both firms, that is 
there are profit complementarities in the product market. We leave un-
specified the relation between r(1, 2) and r(1, 1) to allow for both posi-
tive (r(1, 1) < π(1, 2)) and negative (r(1, 1) > r(1, 2)) externalities1. Thus 
a firm, when its rival starts using the more efficient technology, may make 
either more profits (positive externality) or less profits (negative external-
ity).
Uncertainty comes from demand side and it is denoted with Yt as a mul-
tiplicative shock on per period equilibrium profit. We assume that Yt follows 
a geometric Brownian motion:
(4) dYt = Yt  μdt + Ytvdw
where n < r, is the drift parameter2, r is the risk free discount rate, v > 0 is 
the volatility parameter, and dw is the increment of a Wiener process. Thus 
dw is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and var-
iance dt. There is complete information about all the relevant parameters of 
the model.
The game proceeds as follows. In absence of action taken by either firm, 
the stochastic process evolves according to (4). If one of the two firms has 
not invested at any time x < t, its action set is At = {invest, don’t invest}. If, 
on the other hand, it has invested at some x < t, than At = {don’t invest}. 
Thus, each firm faces a control problem in which its only choice is when to 
1 Following Dasgupta (2003), by externalities we mean «the side effects of human activi-
ties when they are undertaken without mutual agreement. Externalities are often called “spil-
lovers”». For a recent analysis of externalities within the standard new economy geography 
model, see Nocco (2007).
2 The restriction ensures that there is a positive opportunity cost to holding the option to 
invest, and so the option is not held indefinitely.
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choose the action «stop». After taking this action, the firm can make no fur-
ther move to influence the outcome of the game3.
As usual for dynamic games, the game is solved backwards using sub-
game perfection. In particular, we are looking for Markov perfect equilibria 
(MPE) in pure strategies.
In what follows, two models are studied (as in Marseguerra - Cortelezzi - 
Dominioni, 2006). In the first, there is no pre-emption effect since one agent 
is exogenously assigned the role of investing first. By ruling out the possibil-
ity of pre-emption, this allows to concentrate on the option value of waiting 
under complementarities and externalities. In the second model, instead, the 
order of investment is endogenously determined.
3. Equilibrium with exogenous order of actions
This model is well suited to study cases in which one firm has a clear ad-
vantage in the adoption of a new technology, e.g. it may be technically more 
literate, have a more flexible organization, or be less dependent on an exist-
ing technology. For example, Bresnahan (1998) argues that there are strong 
first-mover advantages in high tech sectors because early firms in the compu-
ter software market are able to set standards4.
3.1. Sequential Investment
Let us start by assuming that the preassigned leader and follower invest 
at different instants. The possibility of simultaneous investment is consid-
ered in the next subsection. Denoting with i = L, F respectively the leader 
and the follower payoffs, in what follows we derive the expected total 
discounted profits of the leader and of the follower. As usual in dynamic 
games, the stopping time game is solved backwards, in a dynamic program-
ming fashion.
The Follower’s Problem. Let us first value the payoff of being a follower. 
It has three different components holding over different ranges of Y. The 
first, F0(Y), describes the value of investment before the leader has invested; 
the existing technology yields a profit Yr(1, 1) per unit of time and its pres-
ent discounted value is 1 1,r
Y
n
r
-
_ i
. Moreover, the follower holds the option to
3 See Fudenberg - Tirole (1985) and Dutta - Rustichini (1991), for details.
4 Moreover, Bessen - Maskin (2009) argue that in certain industries, and in particular in 
the high-tech sectors of computer software and hardware, innovation is both sequential and 
complementary.
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exchange the existing technology for the new one conditional to the leader 
having already invested. The option to invest should be valued accordingly. 
In the second region, F1(Y), the leader has already adopted the new technol-
ogy, and the follower has to choose his adoption strategy to maximise his 
option’s value. Thus, the value of the follower can be characterised as a port-
folio containing the existing technology, yielding a profit Yr(1, 2) per unit of
time and a present discounted value of 2,r
Y 1
n
r
-
_ i , plus an option to exchange
the existing technology with the new one. Finally, in the third region, F2(Y), 
paying an irreversible adoption cost I, the follower can adopt the new tech-
nology and obtain an instantaneous profit Yr(2, 2), with a present discounted
value of 2,r
Y 2
n
r
-
_ i . The follower’s value function, F(Y), is thus given by:
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where, following Dixit - Pindyck (1994), the value matching and smooth 
pasting conditions are used to determine the critical level of uncertainty 
which triggers the new technology adoption, YF, and the unknown coef-
ficient B1, whilst the value of the unknown constant B0 is found by consid-
ering the impact of the leader’s investment trigger point, YL, on the payoff 
of the follower (see Appendix 1 for a formal derivation). We have:
(6) 
2 2 1 2
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Y r IF $ $ $
b
b
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r r
=
-
-
-
] ] ]g g g
Note that YF is inversely related to the gain r(2, 2) − r(1, 2), that is, to 
the magnitude of the externality caused by the leader investment. The above 
result is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Conditional on the leader having adopted the new technol-
ogy, the optimal follower strategy is to adopt the new technology as soon as Yt 
equals or exceeds the trigger value YF as given in eq. (6). The corresponding 
optimal entry timing of the follower, TF  , is:
(7) 0
1 2 2 1 2
1inf :
, ,
T t Y r IF $ $ $$ $
b
b
n
r r
=
-
-
-
] ] ]g g g( 2
By simple substitution, the value of being the follower is thus given by 
the following expression:
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The Leader’s Problem. Let us now consider the value of the leader, L(Y), 
conditional on the follower pursuing his optimal strategy, in accordance with 
the rule derived above. As before, there are three components of the leader’s 
value function holding over different ranges of Y. The first, L0(Y), describes 
the value of investment before the leader (and so the follower) has invested. 
The existing technology yields a profit Yr(1, 1) per unit of time with a present
discounted value 1 1( , )r
Y
n
r
-  and the option to invest given that at some value
YF the follower will invest too. The second, L1(Y), describes the situation af-
ter the leader has already adopted the new technology giving up the existing 
one, but before the follower has invested. After investing at Y < YF, the leader 
gains duopoly profit Yr(2, 1) per unit of time with a present discounted
value of 2 1( , )r
Y
n
r
-  and still has the option to invest. Finally, in the third re-
gion, L2(Y), the follower has adopted the new technology, thereby 
increasing leader’s profits to Yr(2, 2) per unit of time, with
a present discounted value of 2 2( , )r
Y
n
r
- . If the leader invests when Y ≥ YF,
the follower will invest too, so that the leader’s expected value of the invest-
ment is F(Y). The value of the leader, denoted by L(Y), can be expressed as 
follows:
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where BL0 and BL1 are the coefficients of the option value to invest and
(10) 
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See again Appendix 1 for the formal derivation of YL, BL0 and BL1. The 
following Proposition summarises the result.
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Proposition 2. The optimal leader strategy is to adopt the new technology 
the first moment that Yt equals or exceeds the trigger value YL , i.e. the optimal 
entry time of the leader, TL , can be written as:
(11) inf :
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By simple substitution we are able to write the leader’s value function:
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Note that the leader stopping time is inversely related to the gain of be-
ing the leader, i.e. r(2, 1) − r(1, 1). Furthermore, a simple comparison of 
eqs. (6) and (10) shows that YF does not depend on YL and symmetrically 
YL does not depend on YF. Finally, YL < YF if and only if r(2, 2) − r(1, 2) < 
r(2, 1) − r(1, 1), that is when the gain of being a leader is greater than the 
gain of being a follower. If r(2, 2) − π(1, 2) ≥ r(2, 1) − π(1, 1), then YL ≥ YF 
and the investment would occur as a cascade, that is the leader would invest 
at YL and the follower would invest immediately afterwards. The results are 
summarised in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. When the gain of being a leader is greater than the gain of 
being a follower, a sequential adoption pattern arises in equilibrium. Otherwise 
a cascade investment occurs at YL.
As far as the impact of uncertainty on adoption timing, since 02
2
2
v
b
from eqs. (6) and (10) it follows that greater uncertainty induces an higher 
trigger value5 for both the leader and the follower. Thus, higher uncertainty 
tends to delay the adoption of the new technology. The intuition for these 
results has been stressed by McDonald - Siegel (1986) and Pindyck (1988) 
among the others. Uncertainty combined with a sunk cost creates an option 
5 If a Marshallian rule were used for the investment decision, the trigger point would be
 simply the cost, i.e.
 2 2 1 2, ,
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value of delaying investment and it should be incorporated in the present 
discounted value calculation regarding the investment decision. By investing 
in the new technology, the firm exercises the option and loses the opportu-
nity of waiting for more favorable circumstances. Thus, as in the standard 
option theory, the profitability of the new technology has to be higher in 
order to compensate for the possible loss coming from uncertainty. Finally, 
as for the magnitude of the externality arising from the rival’s adoption of 
the more efficient technology, it does not affect the leader (neither his value 
function nor his adoption time) but it does affect the follower, who invests 
earlier the greater the gain from adoption.
3.2. Simultaneous Investment
We now consider the special case where both firms decide on a common 
adoption time TS, where TS = inf(t | Yt ≥ 0). Note that here the only aspect of 
cooperation is the timing of adoption of the new technology and that firms 
maintain a non-cooperative behavior in the product market – see Mason - 
Weeds (2010), for this kind of analysis. The value function of each firm, de-
noted by S(Y), under a simultaneous adoption rule is
(13) S
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(see Appendix 1 for formal derivations). The following Proposition holds.
Proposition 4. The optimal simultaneous adoption strategy is to invest 
in the new technology as soon as Yt equals or exceeds the trigger value YS as 
given in eq. (14). The corresponding optimal entry timing can be written as:
 0
1 2 2 1 1
1inf :
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] ] ]g g g( 2
It is worth noticing that YS < YL since r(2, 1) > r(1, 1) by assumption (1). 
Thus, under profit complementarity and an exogenous order of actions, co-
operation on the investment timing is unequivocally socially beneficial. More-
over YS < YF when there are positive externalities, i.e. if r(1, 2) > r(1, 1), 
and YS > YF when there are negative externalities, i.e. r(1, 2) < r(1, 1). This 
is quite reasonable: when adoption is viewed within the competition frame-
482
work, this simpliy says that a positive (negative) spillover induces firms to 
invest earlier (later) in the simultaneous equilibium.
3.3. Sequential versus Simultaneous Investment
We want now to investigate under what conditions will the two firms de-
cide a common adoption time, i.e. when simultaneous rather than sequential/
cascade equilibrium will arise. The following Proposition holds:
Proposition 5. The necessary and sufficient condition for a simultaneous 
investment to occur in equilibrium is
(15) 
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Proof. See Appendix 1. ■
Whether simultaneous adoption occurs in equilibrium is determined by 
whether the leader wishes to adopt before the follower, or at the same time 
(i.e., by comparison of S(Y) and L(Y)). Note that the simultaneous adoption 
equilibrium, when it exists, Pareto dominates the sequential outcome; this is an 
immediate consequence of the condition for the existence of the simultaneous 
adoption equilibrium: S(Y) > L(Y) for Y ∈ [0; YS]. Figure 1 allows us to have 
an immediate perception of the parameters’ effect6.
Note that under a first mover advantage and a weakly positive spillo-
ver, the equilibrium pattern is a decreasing function of the variance and it 
switches from a simultaneous equilibrium (for lower values of v2) to a se-
quential equilibrium (for high values of v2).
4. Equilibrium with endogenous order of actions
In contrast with the setting considered in the previous Section, assume 
now that the leader is endogenously determined (i.e. both firms may a priori 
potentially become leader).
4.1. Sequential Investment
Without the ability to precommit to trigger points at the beginning of the 
game, the leader’s stopping time cannot be derived as the solution to a single 
6 Parameter values are as follows: The discount rate r has been set equal to 0.08, the 
investment cost I has been normalised to 1, and the profits are r(1, 1) = 4, r(2, 1) = 7, 
r(2, 2) = 8 and r(1, 2) = 3 (negative spillover) and r(1, 2) = 5 (positive spillover).
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agent optimization problem. Whether a firm becomes a leader and invests, is 
determined by the firm’s incentive to preempt its rival. Thus, the roles of the 
leader and the follower are determined endogenously. Firms are symmetric be-
fore moving, i.e. no firm has a clear advantage from the beginning. As before, 
let us assume that one firm (the pre-emptor) invests strictly before the other. 
The follower’s value function and trigger point are the same as for the model 
without pre-emption. The leader’s value function is as described in the previ-
ous Section. However, the leader can no longer choose its adoption point op-
timally, as if the roles were preassigned. Instead, the first firm to adopt does so 
at the point at which it prefers to lead rather than follow7. Hence, the adop-
tion point, YP, is defined by the indifference between leading and following:
 L1(YP) = F1(YP)
The following Proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 6. There exists a unique endogenous cascade equilibrium out-
come at YP ≡ YF.
Proof. See Appendix 2. ■
7 As in Grenadier (1996) we assume that «if each tries to invest first, one will randomly 
(i.e. through the toss of a coin) win the race».
FIG. 1. Equilibrium Analysis (a).
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4.2. Simultaneous Investment
The solution for simultaneous investment in the pre-emption model is the 
same as in the model without pre-emption: the trigger point is the same, YS, 
and therefore we refer the reader to the previous Section.
4.3. Sequential versus Simultaneous Investment
When does simultaneous rather than sequential equilibrium arise? The 
following Proposition holds:
Proposition 7. If YS > (<)YP  , i.e. for r(1, 2) < (>)r(1, 1), two types of 
equilibria exist: the endogenous equilibrium described in the previous Proposi-
tion and the joint investment equilibrium. Moreover, the joint investment equi-
librium Pareto dominates the decentralized equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2. ■
5. Equilibrium Under Cooperation
This Section analyses the cooperative solution, i.e. when agents’ invest-
ment trigger points are chosen to maximise the sum of their two value func-
tions. The objective is to provide a benchmark to identify inefficiencies in 
the next Section.
Let us first examine the case when investment is sequential. The two trig-
ger points, Y1L and Y2F, are chosen to maximise the sum of the leader’s and 
follower’s value functions, denoted by CLUF(Y), that is
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where Bk, k = 0, 1, 2, 3 are constants to be determined. The cooperative trig-
ger points are determined by the value matching and smooth pasting condi-
tions at both points (see Appendix 3 for a formal derivation) and they are 
given by
(17) 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
1
, , ,
Y r I1L $ $ $
b
b
n
r r r
=
-
-
+ -
] ] ] ]g g g g
485
(18) 
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The results are summarised in the following Proposition.
Proposition 8. Conditional on roles exogenously assigned, the optimal 
leader strategy is to adopt the new technology the first moment that Yt equals 
or exceeds the trigger value Y1L , and the optimal follower strategy is to adopt 
the new technology the first moment that Yt equals or exceeds the trigger value 
Y2L. That is, the optimal entry time of the leader, T1L , and of the follower, T2L , 
can be written, respectively, as:
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It is worth noticing that Y1L ≷ Y2F. Precisely, Y1L < Y2F if π(2, 1) − 
π(1, 1) > π(2, 2) − π(1, 2), and a sequential pattern of adoption of the new 
technology arises; Y1L ≥ Y2F if π(2, 1) − π(1, 1) ≤ π(2, 2) − π(1, 2) and in this 
case a cascade investment occurs at Y1L. Let us now consider the cooperative 
solution with simultaneous investment at the trigger point Y3S. The coopera-
tive value function in this case is
(21) 
2
C Y
B Y
I
Y Y
Y Y
4 3
3
2 1 1
2 2 2
( , )
,S
S
S
r
Y
r
Y
1
$
=
+
-
b
n
r
n
r
-
-
] _g i
Z
[
\
]
]
Again, value matching and smooth pasting determine Y3S and simultane-
ously B4, given by
(22) 
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Proposition 9 In the cooperative solution with simultaneous investment, 
the optimal strategy is to adopt the new technology the first moment that Yt 
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equals or exceeds the trigger value Y3S , i.e. the optimal entry timing of both 
firms, T3S , can be written as:
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Note that in both cases Y3S < Y1L but two different adoption patterns are 
possible. If r(2, 2) − r(1, 2) < r(2, 1) − π(1, 1), then Y3S < Y1L < Y2F. If r(2, 
2) − r(1, 2) > r(2, 1) − r(1, 1), then Y3S < Y2F < Y1L. As in the previous Sec-
tion, the following Proposition spells out the conditions leading to the simul-
taneous rather than sequential adoption pattern:
Proposition 10. The necessary and sufficient condition for simultaneous 
investment to be the cooperative solution is CS(Y) > CLUF(Y), ∀ Y ∈ [YS , YL], 
i.e., 
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Proof. See Appendix 3. ■
Figure 2 shows an example. Note that in the cooperative case the simul-
taneous adoption is always preferred.
6. Inefficiencies
In this Section we analyse the inefficiencies that may arise in the nonco-
operative equilibria in comparison with the cooperative solution.
Let us first consider the model with the roles exogenously assigned. 
We identify two inefficiencies in the investment decisions, one for the lead-
er’s strategy and the other for the follower’s strategy. The leader can in-
vest either too early or too late with respect to the benchmark case of the 
cooperative adoption. Specifically, YL > Y1L if there are positive spillo-
vers, i.e. r(1, 2) > r(1, 1), and YL < Y1L if there are negative spillovers, i.e. 
r(1, 2) < r(1, 1). Therefore, conditional on both equilibria involving sequen-
tial investment, with respect to the cooperative case in the non-cooperative 
case the leader will invest later if there are positive spillovers and earlier if 
there are negative spillovers. On the other hand, the follower always invests 
later, without considering the effect of the spillovers of the leader strategy. In 
fact, YF > Y2F since r(2, 2) > r(2, 1) by assumption. Therefore, conditional on 
both equilibria involving sequential investment, the follower always invests 
later than in the cooperative case.
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Let us now consider the investment strategies resulting from the model 
with endogenous roles. Note that YP < Y3S if there are negative spillo-
vers, i.e. r(1, 2) < r(1, 1), while YP > Y3S if there are positive spillovers, i.e. 
π(1, 2) > π(1, 1). Therefore, conditional on both equilibria involving simulta-
neous adoption, firms will invest either later under negative spillover or ear-
lier under positive spillover. Finally, there are no inefficiencies in the case of 
simultaneous adoption.
Summing up, cooperation is not necessarily beneficial as far as the leader 
whilst it is always beneficial as far as the follower. In other words, competi-
tion can lead to «too much» waiting, which can be sub-optimal. Thus it is in 
general unclear whether offering firms the option to cooperate is beneficial, 
but this analysis provides an argument for a closer look to merger and joint 
ventures, which may lead to a reduction of investment inefficiencies by inter-
nalizing the externality effects.
7. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the combined effect of market structure, 
profit complementarities and externalities on the adoption of a new and 
more efficient technology. The analysis is developed within a stochastic dy-
namic game which allows to consider not only the decision to adopt or not 
to adopt the technology, jointly or separately, but also the decision concern-
ing when to adopt. We have analysed in particular how investment decisions 
FIG. 2. Equilibrium Analysis (b).
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are affected by the market structure under which firms operate (i.e. non-co-
operative vs. cooperative behaviour).
As far as the non-cooperative situation, we focused on two different 
economic settings. We have first considered the case of a firm with a clear 
advantage in the adoption of the new technology, so that it can act as pre-
designated leader (and the order of actions is therefore exogenously given). 
In this scenario, if the gain of being the leader is greater than the gain of 
being the follower, we have shown that a sequential adoption pattern arises 
in equilibrium. Otherwise a cascade investment occurs. Furthermore, when 
both firms decide on a common adoption time, and thus they cooperate 
but only on timing, the (necessarily simultaneous) investment takes place 
earlier. We derive the precise conditions under which common adoption 
arises.
The second economic setting we investigated is a situation where the two 
firms may both potentially invest and adopt the new technology. Neither firm 
can now be absolutely sure to be the first to adopt and thus now the leader 
is endogenously determined. In this scenario, we show that there exists a 
unique cascade equilibrium outcome and, again, we derive the conditions 
under which common adoption arises. As a benchmark case for analysing 
market’s inefficiencies, we have also derived the model’s fully cooperative so-
lutions, i.e. when investment trigger points are chosen so as to maximise the 
sum of the two firms’ value functions. We derive both the sequential (with a 
pre-assigned leader) and the simultaneous (no pre-assigned leader) adoption 
patterns and the conditions under which a simultaneous investment equilib-
rium arises. Comparing the non cooperative with the cooperative solutions, 
we show that in the non-cooperative case the leader will invest later if there 
are positive externalities and earlier if there are negative externalities, whilst 
the follower always invests later. Thus, the results of the comparisons show 
that in general it is unclear whether offering firms the option to cooperate is 
beneficial. The analysis here developed however provides an argument for a 
closer look to merger and joint ventures by precisely spelling out the specific 
conditions in which these cooperative institutions may lead to substantial in-
vestment inefficiencies’ reduction.
An interesting extension to our analysis would be to investigate how mar-
ket structure affects profit complementarities among adoption decisions. This 
would provide a further link between competition policy and technological 
diffusion.
8. Appendix 1
This Appendix is devoted to a formal derivation of the follower’s and 
the leader’s value functions. First, as far as the follower’s value function, note 
that at each point in time the follower can either invest, and take the termi-
nation payoff, or can wait for an infinitesimal time dt and postpone the deci-
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sion. Denoting by FF, 1(Y) the option value to invest, the Bellman equation of 
the problem is
 1 2
1
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n
r
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+] ] ] ]g g g g6 @( 2
where E denotes the expectation, VF(Y) denotes the firm’s equity value, net 
of the investment cost I. In the continuation region the Bellman equation for 
the value of the investment opportunity, FF, 1(Y), is given by
rFF, 1dt = E(dFF, 1)
Expanding dFF, 1 using Ito’s lemma and after some simple substitution, 
the Bellman equation entails the following second-order differential equation
 ( )Y F Y YF Y rF Y
2
1 0, , ,F F F
2 2
1 1 1v n+ - =m l] ]g g
From (4) it can be seen that if Y ever goes to zero it stays there forever. 
Therefore FF, 1(Y) must satisfies the following boundary condition
 FF, 1(0) = 0
and the general solution for the above differential equation is
 FF, 1(Y) = B1Yb + B2Ym
where b > 1 and m < 0 are respectively the positive and the negative root of
the fundamental characteristic equation8 Q z z z z r122
1 v n= - + -] ]g g , and
B1 and B2 are unknown constant to be determined. Imposing the previous 
boundary condition the value of the option to invest is
 FF, 1(Y) = B1Yb
and the option value of waiting is
 ,F Y
r
Y B Y1 21 1
n
r
=
-
+ b] ]g g
The value in the first region is derived applying the same procedure. The 
value of the option to invest is FF, 0 = B0Yb, and the expected value of the
8 See Dixit - Pindyck (1996, pp. 142-143), for details.
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firm if it would never invest is 1 1,r
Y
n
r
-
` j
. By summing up these two compo-
nents gives
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that is the option value of waiting in the first region. We next consider the 
value of the firm in the stopping region, F3(Y). Since investment is irrevers-
ible, the value of the agent in the stopping region is given by the expected 
value alone with no option value terms, i.e.
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Putting together the three regions gives the follower’s value function F(Y) 
(eq. (5) in the text). Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) the two compo-
nents of the follower’s value function F0(Y) and F1(Y) have to meet smoothly 
at YF with equal first derivatives, and, together with the value matching con-
dition, this implies
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Solving the above system, we can compute the value of the optimal trig-
ger point YF (eq. (6) in the text) and the unknown constant B1, i.e.
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When YL is first reached, the leader invests and the follower payoff is 
altered either positively or negatively. Since the value functions are forward-
looking, F0(Y) anticipates the effect of the leader’s action and must therefore 
meet F1(Y) at YL. Hence, a value matching condition holds at this point; 
however there is no optimality on the part of the follower, and so no corre-
sponding smooth pasting condition. This implies that
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By simple substitution we get eq. (8) in the text. As far as the value of 
being the leader, denoted by L(Y), it can be expressed as follows:
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Let us first derive the second component of L1(Y). We define the first 
term of equation L1(Y) as
 2 1( ) ,f Y E e Y dt
T
r tF r x= x- -8 ]] gg68 @ B
Applying the Bellman principle, we get
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Expanding the right hand side using Ito’s Lemma and rearranging, we 
obtain the following differential equation
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whose general solution is ( ) .f Y A Y A Y1 2
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 Note that if Y ap-
proaches YF, than TF goes to zero, and if Y approaches zero, than it will 
remain at zero for TF becoming infinitely large. Therefore, the following 
boundary conditions apply:
 f(YF) = 0
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It follows that A2 = 0 and 0A Y1
2 1,
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The same procedure applies to determine the second term of L1(Y), L0(Y) 
and L2(Y). When YF is first reached, the follower invests and the leader’s 
expected flow payoff is altered. Since value functions are forward-looking, 
L1(Y) anticipates the effect of the follower’s action and must therefore meet 
L2(Y) at YF. Hence, a value matching condition holds at this point; however 
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there is no optimality on the part of the leader, and so no corresponding 
smooth pasting condition. This implies
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The usual value matching and smooth pasting conditions at the optimally 
chosen YL determine the other unknown variables:
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Solving the system, we can compute the value of the optimal trigger point 
YL (equation (10) in the text) and unknown constant BL0, i.e.
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By simple substitution we get eq. (12) in the text. Let us now compute 
the value function of both firms in case of simultaneous adoption. Denot-
ing by FS(Y) the option to invest of each firm, the optimal investment rule is 
given by:
 , ,F Y Max V Y
r
Y
r
E F Y dY Y1 1
1
1
S S S
n
r
= -
- +
+] ] ] ]g g g g6 @( 2
where VS(Y) is the equity value of each firm net of the investment cost I, and 
E denotes the expectation. The value of the option to invest is
 FS(Y) = BSYb
where b > 1 is the positive root of the usual characteristic equation and 
BS ≥ 0 is an unknown constant. The option value of waiting is
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We next consider the value of the firms in the stopping region, for t ≥ TS. 
The expected value of the firms equity must satisfy the following equation:
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Working out the expectation, the above expression reduces to:
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Putting togheter eqs. (A1) and (A2), we obtain eq. (13) in the text. Ap-
plying the standard value matching and smooth pasting conditions, it is pos-
sible to determine the critical value of the stochastic process YS that triggers 
the investment:
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By simple substitution, we get the trigger point YS (eq. (14) in the text) 
and the coefficient BS:
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Finally, the necessary and sufficient condition for a simulta-
neous investment to occur in equilibrium is that S(Y) ≥ L(Y) for 
all Y ∈ [YS, YL]. By the convexity of the value functions, this re-
quires that S(Y) ≥ L(Y) for all Y ∈ (0, YS], i.e. BS ≥ BL0. Therefore,
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stituting the trigger points, YS, YL, YF, yields the result (eq. (15) in the text).
9. Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us define the function D(Y) = L1(Y) − F1(Y), 
describing the gain of pre-emption, where L1(Y) is conditional on the 
«preemptor» having invested, and F1(Y) is the option value of the follower. 
By simple substitution we obtain
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Now, to prove the existence and uniqueness of the trigger point YF, no-
tice that:
1. D(0) = −I < 0;
2. D(YF) = 0.
3. By computing the first derivative D′(Y), and evaluating it at YF and 0, 
we get:
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The second derivative ensures now the monotonicity of the function, and 
therefore the uniqueness of the trigger point.
Proof of Proposition 7. In order to show the existence of both 
equilibria, we have to prove that FS(Y) > FF(Y) for Y ∈ (0, YF] and 
FS(Y) > VF(Y) for all Y ∈ (YF, YS]. Let us define D(Y) = FS(Y) − VS(Y) − I, i.e.
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As VS(Y) ≡ VF(Y) for Y > YF and YS > YF, it follows that D(YF) > 0 and there-
fore FS(Y) > VF(Y) − I for all Y ∈ [YF, YS]. Moreover, FS(0) > FF (0) and 
FS(YF) > FF(YF). By monotonicity of the functions FS(Y) and FF(Y) we get the 
result. ■
10. Appendix 3
Proof of Proposition 8. The cooperative trigger points are determined by 
the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at both points. At Y1L, the 
conditions are the following:
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Solving the above system, we get the leader’s trigger point, Y1L (eq. (17) 
in the text). At Y2F the conditions are the following:
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Again, solving this system we first get the follower’s trigger point (eq. 
(18) in the text) and then
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Proof of Proposition 10. The necessary and sufficient condition for 
simultaneous investment to occur in equilibrium is CS(Y) > CLUF(Y) for 
all Y ∈ [YS, YL]. The strict convexity of the value functions requires 
CS(Y) > CLUF (Y) for all Y ∈ [0, YS], i.e. B4 > B0 + B1. Simple substitution 
yields to (25) in the text. ■
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Summary: Strategic Investment Timing Under Profit Complementarities (J.E.L. C73, D81, L13, O33)
This paper analyses strategic investment games between two firms that compete for the adoption of 
a new more efficient technology whose returns are uncertain. We assume that once one of the two firms 
adopted the new technology, joint adoption is preferable for both firms, that is there are profit comple-
mentarities in the product market. There are, moreover, externalities derivig from the first firm’s invest-
ment. By modelling the switch from a well established technology to a new one as a dynamic stochastic 
game, we fully characterize the equilibria of the game under both non-cooperative and cooperative firms’ 
behaviour. We show that in the cooperative equilibrium firms will invest later under negative externalities 
and earlier under positive externalities. Thus we identify circumstances in which competiton can be sub-
optimal (too much waiting). Overall, compared to earlier models that only allow for a new market game, 
our model examines a richer set of strategic interactions of adoption decisions.
